International Lawyer
Volume 26

Number 3

Article 5

1992

The Development of Insolvency Law as Part of the Transition from
a Centrally Planned to a Market Economy
Evan D. Flashcen
Timothy B. DeSieno

Recommended Citation
Evan D. Flashcen & Timothy B. DeSieno, The Development of Insolvency Law as Part of the Transition
from a Centrally Planned to a Market Economy, 26 INT'L L. 667 (1992)
https://scholar.smu.edu/til/vol26/iss3/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted
for inclusion in International Lawyer by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please
visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

D.

FLASCHEN*

TIMoTHY B.

DESIENO**

EVAN

The Development of Insolvency Law as
Part of the Transition from a Centrally
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With a Soviet-dominated Central Europe now largely a matter of historical
curiosity, a number of countries and newly independent republics are addressing
the host of economic, social, and legal issues involved in the painful transition
from a centrally planned economy to a market economy. One of the strongest
features of a market economy is the ability of a risk-taking enterprise to reap the
benefits of any success it is able to achieve. As a necessary counterbalance to
encouraging a private enterprise to succeed, a market economy must also provide
mechanisms for dealing with enterprises that fail. As part of its new legal
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structure, therefore, a country in transition to a market economy will need a set
of insolvency laws to provide a predictable mechanism for the liquidation or
reorganization of failing enterprises.
A second reason supports the implementation of modem insolvency laws. Just as the
central government will no longer be able to siphon off a successful enterprise's profits,
so too will the unsuccessful compensate it for its losses. With the loss of the central
government as the largest investor, newly privatized enterprises will need to attract
capital from other sources, including foreign investors. As one of the necessary prerequisites for attracting foreign investment, a market economy will need to demonstrate
to the investor the existence of an established, predictable mechanism for seeking
recovery of the invested capital in the event the enterprise fails. Modem insolvency
laws provide this sense of predictability. The precise wording of the laws is less
important-investors can adjust their return on investment requirements based on the
level of perceived risk-as long as the laws provide for a predictable result and are
applied consistently by the local courts.
This article discusses some of the more significant considerations relevant to the
development of insolvency laws for countries in transition to a market economy.
I. Background
A.

OVERVIEW

The following pages contain a discussion of a number of considerations that
the authors feel would be crucial to any transition from a centrally planned,
socialist economy to a free-market economy. While the authors prepared the
discussion specifically for the newly independent Baltic Republics, they have
revised it somewhat to make it more generally applicable to any similarly situated nation.
Any nation that commences a transition from a centrally planned economy to
a market economy will encounter a host of difficulties. Insolvency laws-laws
that govern the substantive and procedural rights of enterprises and their creditors
in the event of financial difficulty-are as critical to the success of such a
transition as are other laws that focus more directly on the financial institutions
that will define the marketplace (for example, laws creating and regulating banking, securities, and commodities industries).
While the various insolvency systems around the world differ markedly from
one another, virtually all of them share two primary objectives: to facilitate credit
in commercial transactions by providing an orderly system for the liquidation of
financially troubled enterprises; and to protect the rights of, and provide equal
treatment to, similarly situated creditors and employees of insolvent enterprises.
Because all but the most basic market economies are, to some degree, dependent upon credit, virtually every market's operation will be disturbed when credit
is not repaid in accordance with the terms of credit contracts. Insolvency laws
lend a necessary element of predictability to market economies by establishing a
framework for determining and enforcing the consequences that arise when a
VOL. 26, NO. 3
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particular entity cannot repay its credit. It is not that creditors need assurances
that their debts will be repaid even in an insolvency; rather, creditors need to be
able to predict with some certainty the consequences of an insolvency, whether
those consequences are favorable or unfavorable. With an understanding of those
consequences, creditors will have a framework for assessing the credit terms
(such as interest rate, maturity date, requirement of collateral, and so forth) that
they should demand from a particular enterprise. Stated differently, rational
insolvency laws create a degree of certainty that allows creditors to make more
rational investment decisions than they otherwise could, thus resulting in a
greater availability of credit in the market as a whole.
Promoting more efficient investment decisions, and ultimately, a more efficient market, is one of the primary purposes of an insolvency law. A second
purpose is to ensure that similarly situated creditors of an insolvent enterprise
trouble often exercise their contractual and legal rights by pursuing the assets of
the enterprise as a source for repayment of their credit. Stronger or larger creditors will often be swifter, to the detriment of others. Certain creditors may
succeed in preventing the enterprise's use of crucial assets, effectively preventing the enterprise from continuing operations. Such actions also work to the
detriment of other creditors.
In the absence of an insolvency administration, creditors who proceed most
swiftly enjoy the greatest likelihood of being repaid. While such a race for the
enterprise's assets may benefit individual creditors, it will harm the creditor body
as a whole (both by depriving them of access to the assets seized and by accelerating the economic dismemberment of the enterprise). Consequently, an insolvency law should not reward the swiftest creditors, but should stay creditor
action and thereby afford the enterprise and all of its creditors the ability to
resolve financial difficulties more equitably.
In addition to the two universal policies noted above, many insolvency systems (including the systems in the United States and England) also favor a third
policy objective: to afford a "fresh start" to the financially troubled but honest
debtor, particularly in cases of insolvent individuals. This goal is implicit in
some insolvency systems and explicit in the more debtor-oriented systems. In
countries where this third policy is adopted, two subsets of policy concerns arise:
the terms and conditions of granting a discharge of an enterprise's obligations;
and the procedures to be adopted to support legitimate attempts to reorganizeas opposed to liquidate-struggling businesses.
Any emerging market economy will weigh the risks and the rewards of emphasizing the policies in support of creditors' rights and those in support of an
enterprise's ability to reorganize and receive a discharge. During the transition
period, further complications emerge due to the need to balance the ideal objectives of an enacted insolvency system with the practical reality of fragile
market economies that may not survive the consequences of a blind application
of stated policies.
FALL 1992
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The transition to market economies will inevitably result in a high failure rate
among newly privatized enterprises. A liberal approach to discharge might encourage private individuals and groups of individuals to take the economic risks
that will be necessary to start new businesses in a very uncertain economic
climate. A liberal approach to reorganization will give courts an additional
measure of flexibility to support businesses that have a chance to survive in the
new market environment. On the other hand, at least until the market economies
are fully established and foreign investors have acquired greater familiarity and
experience with the way in which businesses will succeed (and fail) under the
new system, liberal approaches to discharge and reorganization may only serve
to increase the nervousness of foreign investors. With increased anxieties these
investors are less willing to take risks in the new and untested marketplaces.
Once the basic policy decisions are made, any insolvency system should be
formulated so that the system as implemented serves the purposes for which it is
intended. Insolvency laws are of little benefit if they work well from an academic
and philosophical point of view, but do not work when they are applied to real
situations. In order to ensure that an insolvency system will work in practice as
well as in theory, the following principles should be carefully considered:
" the law should provide a fair and orderly process for addressing the financial
affairs of insolvent enterprises;
" the law should provide for swift and inexpensive access to the process;
" the law should be impartial, efficient, and expeditious;
" the law should provide a convenient method for collecting and applying
property to the claims against the insolvent enterprise; and
* the law should support commercial and economic processes and harmonize
with the general law as much as possible.
Regardless of the policies a nation chooses, it should design an insolvency
system to balance the policies and allow for a variety of solutions. Often, a
business will be so threatened by financial difficulty that its creditors would
prefer to have the business cease operations, liquidate its assets, and distribute
the proceeds of the sales to the creditors (a liquidation). In other cases, however,
all or part of the business may remain economically viable (albeit after restructuring the operations or adjusting the capital structure), and the creditors may
wish to have the business continue operations, agreeing to be repaid on terms
somewhat different from the terms of their original credit contract (a reorganization).
An insolvency system should provide for courts in which financially troubled
enterprises (or their creditors) can seek relief in both liquidation and reorganization situations. These courts should take jurisdiction over and administer the
assets of the enterprise until it is sold (in the case of a liquidation). It is preferable
that the court's role be limited to that of supervision and dispute resolution,
rather than active day-to-day involvement. Further, in a liquidation, the courts
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should have the ability to monitor the sale of the enterprise's assets in order to
ensure the legitimacy and fairness of the sale procedures.
In the case of a reorganization the courts should be available for redress during
the period after the commencement of a proceeding, but before the successful
reorganization of the business. The reorganization process should consist of a
negotiation among the representatives of the business and the creditors of the
business. These parties should determine how the various credit contracts will be
modified. The parties will base negotiations upon their perception of the value of
the business, and accordingly, how much debt the business can repay. The
negotiations will be most effective if they take place without a great deal of court
supervision, but against the backdrop of measures that court could impose upon
the enterprise and its creditors if the parties cannot agree. If the parties cannot
agree on a reorganization, the law could provide for an ability to force a reorganization if certain criteria are met (minimum recoveries for creditors), or the
law could provide that the enterprise's assets should be liquidated.
B.

REORGANIZATIONS AND LIQUIDATIONS

When faced with a financially troubled business, the parties will need to
analyze whether the business is likely to be profitable and should accordingly be
liquidated or restored to profitability via a restructuring. In individual cases, such
a determination will serve the best interests, in the aggregate, of all interested
parties.
On a larger scale, the insolvency law should reflect the social policies that a
nation wishes to promote. For example, if a nation wishes to preserve as much
job security for employees as possible, its law should be designed to foster
reorganizations (either through a continuation of the enterprise or through a sale
of the enterprise's business as a going concern), thereby preserving the operations of the enterprises that provide employment. If, on the other hand, a nation
wishes to encourage foreign investment as much as possible by promoting creditors' rights, its law should foster liquidations, permitting creditors relatively
quick access to the assets of the financially troubled business in order to satisfy
their debts. As a very broad generalization, the insolvency laws of a majority of
countries are geared primarily toward the liquidation of most insolvent businesses. In a few countries (most notably the United States and France) the laws
provide more practical mechanisms for the reorganization of businesses and the
preservation of employment.
One economic theory worth noting is that it is inefficient and unnecessary to
seek to reorganize failing enterprises in order to preserve employment. The
theory suggests that the assets themselves, rather than the particular business that
utilizes the assets, produce economic value and employment. If an insolvent
enterprise owns productive assets, the enterprise should be liquidated, and the
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productive assets redeployed (via an asset sale or spin-off) to a newly formed or
more efficient enterprise that is better able to utilize the assets. In such cases, the
owners of the business (as well as some creditors) may lose their interests in (and
claims against) the enterprise's assets, but the sale will have preserved the ongoing operations of the former enterprise. The new enterprise will continue to
employ workers and will not necessarily have to incur the usual expenses associated with starting a new business.
Such a redeployment will result in increased employment at the new enterprise. And on a macroeconomic scale, the appropriate employment level for the
market as a whole will be returned to its proper balance. The difficulty with this
theory, particularly during a transition period, is that it can massively disrupt
local economies. From a national employment level it may be considered an
appropriate adjustment to lose 1,000 employees at the local site of a failed
enterprise, while gaining 1,000 employees at the distant site of the new enterprise that is able to operate the productive movable assets on a sounder economic
basis. From the viewpoint of the local economy that lost the 1,000 jobs, however, the adjustment could be catastrophic. If that local economy was entirely
dependent on the failed employer, the government would face the massive task
of retraining and, quite possibly, relocating virtually the entire population. In the
face of such hardships the macroeconomic theory may have to give way to the
reality of the human element involved in any enterprise, thus suggesting a need
for greater flexibility in dealing with failing enterprises in such situations.
C.

THE TRANSITION PERIOD

The transition from a centrally planned, socialist economy to a market economy will be painful and will require intermediate steps. Not only will it take time
to develop the laws and systems that will govern the markets, but a nation
making such a transition will also need to examine the legacy of the socialist
system and choose which aspects of it are worthy of preservation and which
require reforming in light of the transition. Such philosophical reflection will
affect practical decision-making on several issues: which enterprises should remain state-run and which should be privatized; to what extent should the government regulate the privatized enterprises; and what should be done with financially troubled monopolies.
The resolution of such issues will undoubtedly change over time as the markets expand to include larger sectors of the economy. The most significant
changes, however, are likely to occur during the early months and years of the
new market system. This "transition period" may be quite difficult, especially
if a nation decides to revise social policies significantly.
As any formerly socialist nation implements insolvency laws, it will have to
decide the extent to which the law should apply equally to all enterprises and the
extent to which, of necessity, exceptions will be made. Initially, certain essential
VOL. 26, NO. 3
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industries will remain monopolized by a single enterprise. As noted above, other
enterprises, although not monopolies, may provide the principal source of employment for economically depressed regions. It may be considered too disruptive to permit such businesses to liquidate overnight and leave massive local
unemployment in their wake. Until the market systems have progressed sufficiently to allow for the introduction of multiple competing enterprises, a nation
may not be able to afford to allow the monopolies and employment-intensive
enterprises to be liquidated, at least in the short run. Accordingly, there may be
little choice but to provide direct financial assistance to certain enterprises during
this period. Creditor remedies, in general, against such enterprises will presumably expand over time as the enterprises' ability to withstand such remedies
grows. Some industries, however, may be too important to the smooth operation
of the market economy to permit their liquidation. Accordingly, a nation may
wish to exclude certain industries from the application of the insolvency laws (or
provide special treatment for such industries within the laws) even after the
transition period. See the discussion in part II.B. 1. below.
D.

RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS

Any nation that embarks on this transition will become a more significant part
of the "global marketplace." It will encounter the tensions among commercial
nations. Among those tensions will be the need for the resolution of insolvencies
of enterprises with assets in more than one country. Often, such enterprises find
themselves in formal insolvency proceedings in several countries (often commenced by local creditors seeking preferred treatment with respect to local assets). In such a situation two of the policies underlying insolvency systems are
hindered: (1) it will be more expensive and less efficient for insolvent enterprises
to be involved in multiple proceedings rather than in a single proceeding (thereby
making it more difficult for the enterprise to resolve its financial troubles and
reducing the property available for distribution to creditors); and (2) there will be
heightened concerns that creditors in one country will not be treated equally with
similarly situated creditors in another.
In order to resolve these problems an increasing number of commercial nations
are adopting provisions that (1) afford foreign creditors equal status with domestic creditors (reducing somewhat the likelihood that such a creditor will
initiate insolvency proceedings against an insolvent enterprise in the creditor's
country), and (2) govern the recognition of foreign proceedings. The latter provisions may create various forms of relief that can be selected based upon the
circumstances of the case. For example, the provisions could allow a local court
to stay all creditor action against an entity that is in insolvency proceedings in
other nations. Further, the provisions could allow the local court to order that any
property of such an entity (or the proceeds of such property) be turned over to

the jurisdiction of the court overseeing the enterprise's foreign insolvency proFALL 1992

674

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

ceeding. In this context the EEC, the Council of Europe, INSOL International,
and the International Bar Association have each commenced efforts to address
these issues (albeit in widely divergent ways). A nation may want to consider
participating in such efforts in order to provide greater comfort and certainty to
foreign investors (thereby promoting increased foreign investment).
It must be conceded, however, that well-intentioned unilateral "cross-border
insolvency" provisions have not functioned as smoothly as many would have
hoped. Too often, a subconscious (or even conscious) desire to protect local
creditors causes a court, faced with these issues, to provide preferred treatment
to local laws and local creditors. Multilateral treaties have proven to be more
effective, but relatively few such treaties are in effect due to the difficulties of
attempting to resolve the policy concerns of disparate insolvency systems. Nevertheless, international cooperation in insolvency matters will become increasingly essential to the smooth operation of the "global marketplace."
A related issue is the extent to which foreign insolvent individuals and enterprises should be restricted from investing in projects in the nation undertaking
this transition. The reason for restricting such investment is understandablereduction of the risk that foreign investors will become insolvent in their local
ventures. A nation may find it better, however, especially after the transition is
well underway, to allow the market to determine which investments are acceptable and which are too risky. Texaco, for example, which is one of the largest oil
companies in the world, emerged from insolvency proceedings in the United
States within the last several years. Yet many start-up or financially distressed oil
ventures would likely be delighted to receive a substantial investment from
Texaco in their projects.
E.

RELATED LAWS

Although not a part of an enterprise insolvency law, the following provisions
of law are integral to the operation of an insolvency system. Accordingly, an
understanding of these provisions, and the policies they serve, is necessary to the
formulation of an insolvency law.
1. Secured Transactions
From a practical standpoint the development of a law providing for and
governing secured credit is as immediately critical as the development of
insolvency laws. In a market system creditors often will not provide goods or
services on credit, or make loans, unless the repayment of such obligations is
assured by something more than the enterprise's promise. If the enterprise
cannot or will not pay the obligation when it becomes due, such a creditor
would want to pursue another source for repayment. Most often that source will
be assets owned by the enterprise. Thus, in addition to promising to pay its
credit obligations, an enterprise will grant the creditor the right to take posVOL. 26, NO. 3
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session of and sell the enterprise's assets. In the event the enterprise cannot or
will not pay its obligation to the creditor according to the terms of the credit
contract, the creditor will apply the proceeds of the sale to the enterprise's
obligation.
The foregoing is more than theoretical: in a number of countries where obtaining collateral is not customary or practical, businesses have relatively little
ability to obtain meaningful credit. Instead, goods and services are primarily
provided on a cash, barter, or "retention of title" basis. The introduction of
meaningful secured credit, on the other hand, provides greater opportunities for
business operation and expansion. While, inevitably, this leads to more business
failures, it also leads to more business successes by enabling entrepreneurial
enterprises to take greater risks and reap greater rewards.
Some do not agree, however, that secured credit is necessary to the smooth
operation of a market economy. They argue that the availability of secured credit
has the effect of preferring stronger creditors (who can insist on a security
interest) over others. Such a preference is unnecessary to the operation of a
market because creditors require certainty more than anything else. If all creditors can be certain that they will be treated equally, they will have sufficient
incentive to extend credit, assuming the borrower's business is sound. This
theory must be balanced with the reality, however, that western lenders are
accustomed to a system of secured credit and may be reluctant to invest in a
totally unsecured environment.
Any enacted law governing secured credit should address at least four concepts, unless there is a preference to leave security issues entirely to the private
contracts between the parties involved. First, the law must describe how an
enterprise grants the security interest and when it is enforceable by the secured
creditor against the enterprise. This can take the form of a simple contract
between the enterprise and the creditor describing the obligation secured, the
assets pledged as security, and the creditor's rights upon the enterprise's default
in payment of the obligation. Alternatively, the law could be silent as to requirements, leaving the means for the grant and enforcement of the security interest
to the discretion of the contracting parties.
Second, the law must describe the relative rights among secured creditors
themselves (if more than one creditor is secured by the same asset), as well as
among unsecured creditors and secured creditors. Generally, a creditor who
receives a pledge of an enterprise's assets first in time normally has a first priority
claim to those assets. In many jurisdictions, in order to ensure that other potential
secured creditors are aware of prior security interests that an enterprise has
granted in its assets, the law provides for a public, central filing system for both
immovable (real property) and movable (personal property) assets, containing
notice of all security interests granted by all enterprises within the jurisdiction.
Such a filing system allows a potential creditor to determine what priority it will
have with respect to those assets. Secured creditors are required to file a record
FALL 1992
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of their security interest on penalty of losing their priority. A secured creditor
who has properly filed such a record has the right to the proceeds of the assets
securing its obligation before any later filing secured creditors or any unsecured
creditors can be paid out of those proceeds.
Central filing for both movables and immovables is not the rule in all jurisdictions, however. A number of European countries still follow the older systems
of "pledge" and "retention of title" when dealing with movables. Such systems
have worked for hundreds of years and will presumably remain the principal
security devices for movables in a number of countries (particularly civil law
jurisdictions) for the foreseeable future. The benefit of such systems is that they
provide greater efficiency and certainty to secured creditors when they need to
enforce their rights. The disadvantages are that they greatly restrict the ability of
an enterprise to grant liens on assets to multiple creditors (even though there may
be substantial value in the assets above the amount owed to the primary creditor).
Also, they do not provide clear notice to other creditors that particular assets may
not be available for satisfaction of their claims. A creditor in the United States,
for example, will often search the central records to determine whether an enterprise's principal assets are subject to security interests. If nothing appears in
the records, the creditor can be reasonably assured that the enterprise's assets
will be available for the satisfaction of claims in general. Thus, the creditor will
be more likely to provide credit on an unsecured basis.
Third, the law must describe the secured creditor's rights upon the enterprise's
default in payment of the secured obligation. The law should provide that the
secured creditor has the ability to take possession of the assets securing its
obligation and to sell those assets, applying the proceeds of the sale to the
obligation. Alternatively, the law could be silent as to requirements, leaving the
rights of the secured creditor upon default to the discretion of the contracting
parties.
Finally, if there is a strong desire to attract foreign investment, the law should
make most assets freely alienable. That is, foreigners should be permitted to
acquire, own, and dispose of domestic assets that are not politically sensitive and
do not concern the national security.
Secured credit, along with permitted foreign equity investment, will be absolutely crucial to the transition to a market economy. The ability to obtain substantial unsecured credit depends upon a business's credibility and reputation.
Foreign (and even domestic) credit sources will be understandably wary when
lending to enterprises facing free market competition for the first time. The
creditors will be unable to assess the enterprise's ability to repay the credit with
any certainty. On the other hand, those same creditors will have some idea of the
value of the assets used in the operation of its business. Accordingly, the creditors can extend secured credit in instances when unsecured credit would be
imprudent.
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2. Contractualand FiscalResponsibility
Another significant part of the transition to a market system will be the implementation of laws governing the contractual relationships between and among
enterprises. In a market economy, enterprise managers are not held responsible
to artificial, centrally prepared plans. Instead, each private enterprise is free to
choose (based on an analysis of the profitability of each contract) which contracts
to enter into and which to refuse. Each enterprise is then bound by the provisions
of the contracts it signs.
Enterprises must be held legally and economically accountable to each other
for the breach of their contracts. Contracting parties should be able to pursue
their causes of action against each other in lawsuits brought in the civil courts.
3. Negotiated Work-Outs
Just as the state's role in defining the obligations of enterprises will be reduced, so too will its role as the arbiter of contractual disputes. In a market
economy enterprises negotiate with each other on how to resolve their credit
troubles instead of looking to the central planning committee for alternate goods
or funds in the event of a default. Upon an enterprise's default under the provisions of its credit contracts, its creditors will analyze the relative merits of
exercising their collection remedies (including placing the enterprise into
insolvency proceedings) and negotiate modifications to their credit contracts.
Accordingly, an insolvency system for a market economy should implicitly acknowledge and respect the ability of the parties to engage in out-of-court workout discussions.
4. PersonalInsolvencies
Personal insolvencies raise policy concerns quite different from those raised
by enterprise insolvencies. For example, laws governing personal insolvencies
need not strive to attract foreign investment. On the other hand, such laws might
be more concerned with providing the debtor with a "fresh start," thereby
preventing an insolvent person from becoming destitute. Also, personal insolvency laws must address domestic matters-child support and alimony obligations for example.
The law governing personal insolvencies can very well form a part of a single
body of insolvency law (that also addresses enterprises), as it does in the United
States. Many concepts will apply to both types of insolvency, and separate
sections of the law can address the differences. Alternatively, the law could
provide a wholly separate system for addressing individual insolvencies, a system that would be less formal, more expeditious, and inexpensive. While the
primary focus of this report is the insolvency of enterprises, occasional comments will also be made concerning issues of particular importance for insolvent
individuals.
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II. Discussion of Specific Provisions
of an Insolvency Law
A.

GENERAL

1. Purpose
An insolvency law should set forth the purpose for which it has been drafted
and implemented in order to provide a framework for the application and interpretation of its specific provisions. If the objective is to promote efficient operation of the market by enabling creditors to make more knowledgeable investment decisions and by regulating the exercise of creditors' remedies against
financially distressed enterprises, so as to facilitate the greatest and most equitable distribution of property among all creditors and employees (leaving the
enterprise in business when appropriate), the laws should so state. If a competing
objective of providing a "fresh start" for honest debtors exists, this should also
be clearly enunciated.
2. Forms of Relief
The law should set forth the various forms of relief available: recognition and
approval of out-of-court restructurings, liquidation of assets for the benefit of
creditors, reorganization of viable businesses (or the viable parts of a business),
or state economic assistance when necessary.
3. Courts
The law should acknowledge the special judicial expertise required to hear and
decide insolvency-related issues. In time the number of insolvencies may be enough
to warrant either special courts or specially designated units of the general courts
with particular expertise in insolvency matters. In the United States, special courts
exclusively adjudicate insolvency matters, and even those courts are overloaded
with the volume of matters before them. Further, special insolvency courts will
develop expertise in the resolution of insolvency matters through their concentration
on the issues involved. Given the significant changes that can be occasioned upon
enterprises in insolvency proceedings, a nation may wish to consider whether superior courts should handle insolvency matters. On the other hand, given the likelihood that the number of insolvencies in the early stages of the transition will be
substantial, it may be wise to ensure that the judges who are trained in insolvency
matters are also trained in other fields. Over time the number of insolvencies will
decline, and the judges could then be available to hear other matters.
B.

COMMENCEMENT

1. Eligible Types of Enterprises
The insolvency law should contain provisions that govern who is entitled to the
protections of the law, who may commence a proceeding, and the mechanism by
VOL. 26, NO. 3
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which a proceeding is commenced. The broader the spectrum of entities eligible
for the protections afforded by an insolvency law, the more the law will promote
reorganization of enterprises. As a result fewer enterprises will be subject to
creditors' unhampered execution on their assets, leaving the enterprises unable to
continue operations. On the other hand, certain enterprises (banks or insurance
companies, for example) may be so crucial to the financial stability of a market
system in general, that separate, more protective systems should be created to
govern their financial difficulties. During the transition period, a nation may
decide to prohibit the commencement of any type of insolvency proceedings (or
restrict the form of relief available) against monopolies or other crucial enterprises until such time as the markets have matured and could withstand the loss
of such enterprises.
In some countries (Czechoslovakia, for example), the insolvency laws are
available only for merchant enterprises and individuals. If an individual is not
engaged in a trade or business, he cannot petition for insolvency protection. This
type of law stems from a long-standing belief in some areas that insolvent
individuals should not receive a discharge from their debts, and therefore, there
is little point in permitting such individuals to file for insolvency protection.
2. Tests for Determining Eligibility
for Insolvency Proceedings
Beyond deciding which enterprises are eligible for the protections of the
insolvency law, a nation may wish to consider setting forth standards that an
eligible enterprise must satisfy before it may commence an insolvency proceeding. For example, in many countries, an entity must be insolvent under a defined
test (the enterprise's liabilities exceed the fair value of its assets, or the enterprise
is generally unable to pay its obligations when they are due), or an entity must
have committed an "act of bankruptcy" (such as a preferential or fraudulent
conveyance of its assets). Such requirements are designed to ensure that the
insolvency law is invoked only when it is truly needed to protect not only the
interests of the enterprise's managers and employees, but also those of the
enterprise's creditors.
In the United States, on the other hand, the insolvency laws were amended in
1979 to eliminate any standards for most enterprises to satisfy in order to commence an insolvency proceeding. Some argue that enterprises accordingly commence insolvency proceedings not because they need court protection, but as a
means to increase their ability to reduce the burdens of their credit contracts.
Others argue that the stigma of insolvency proceedings prevents truly unnecessary cases. They also argue that it is more efficient to use a court's time to resolve
an enterprise's financial troubles than to determine whether an enterprise is
insolvent.
An insolvency law could also require that an entity commence a proceeding
within a certain period after becoming unable to pay its obligations. In some
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countries with such requirements civil and even criminal penalties can be imposed against directors and other persons in control for failure to commence a
proceeding in time. Such a requirement helps to guard against enterprises incurring debts that they will probably be unable to pay, but at the same time it can
discourage entrepreneurial risk-taking.
3. Involuntary Proceedings
Insolvency systems are designed in large part to protect creditors. Accordingly, every insolvency system should afford creditors the opportunity to commence a proceeding against an eligible enterprise if that enterprise is unable to
acknowledge the gravity of its situation or is unwilling to act.
There is a wide variety of approaches to the commencement of an involuntary
proceeding and to court review of the petition commencing the proceeding. In
some systems, such as those of France and Germany, a single creditor can
commence a case. In other systems, such as that of the United States, a minimum
number of creditors holding a minimum amount in claims must join together.
Virtually all systems, using various procedures, afford the debtor an opportunity
to contest the commencement of the proceeding.
4. Government Intervention
A particularly controversial issue is whether an agency of the government
itself should have the power to commence insolvency proceedings against financially troubled enterprises. In the United States various federal and state government agencies have the unilateral power, and in some cases the statutory
obligation, to commence insolvency or special receivership proceedings against
certain enterprises that engage in businesses particularly dependent on the public
trust. Such entities include, for example, banks, savings and loan institutions,
insurance companies, securities dealers, stockbrokers, utilities, and municipalities. A few of these entities are eligible for relief under special provisions of the
general insolvency laws, but more commonly completely separate and exclusive
receivership statutes and administrative procedures apply to insolvency proceedings of the type described. Such procedures are beyond the scope of this article
since they are more appropriately addressed in the context of establishment of,
for example, banking and insurance regulatory systems.
5. Conversion or Dismissal of the Proceeding
Because almost every insolvency is unique, insolvency laws should be sufficiently flexible to accommodate the particular needs of the particular case. An
insolvency law should probably provide the courts with the flexibility to convert
a case from a reorganization to a liquidation, or vice versa, and the flexibility to
dismiss a case if the interests of creditors and the enterprise are better served
out-of-court.
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Some insolvency systems provide a measure of flexibility by allowing an
enterprise to attempt a reorganization before the enterprise, its creditors, or a
court decide that reorganization is not feasible. For example, French law allows
an enterprise, after filing, to continue operating its business, under the supervision of a trustee and the control of the court. The enterprise operates its
business through an observation period pending the drafting and approval of a
recovery plan, until the court decides that recovery is not feasible and orders a
liquidation.
U.S. law characteristically allows an enterprise or its trustee to convert a
liquidation case into a reorganization case. U.S. law also allows a court to
dismiss a case altogether for cause-whether the case is a liquidation case or a
reorganization-if dismissal is required to prevent abuses or to protect creditors'
interests. The law in the United States even authorizes a court to abstain from
exercising jurisdiction or to suspend a proceeding if dismissal or suspension
would better serve the interests of the enterprise and its creditors. The same is
true if a foreign insolvency proceeding can provide a better forum for administering the assets of the enterprise and processing the claims of the creditors.
C.

MANAGEMENT AND

CoMMITEEs

1. Management
a. Administrators
In most insolvency systems a court-appointed or creditor-designated administrator (also variously called a trustee, liquidator, or receiver) automatically
assumes control of the enterprise upon the commencement of an insolvency
proceeding. The administrator is often a specially trained, specially licensed
expert who deals exclusively in insolvency matters and is expected to provide an
independent and knowledgeable assessment of the prospects for the insolvent
enterprise. The administrator can be an accountant, lawyer, economist, or experienced businessperson. The administrator's profession is less important than is
his or her ability to undertake an independent evaluation of the most appropriate
course of action for an insolvent enterprise. Administrators should have the
ability (and will likely exercise the ability fairly often) to retain the existing
managers of the enterprise, but they should also be empowered to replace those
managers if and when appropriate.
The administrator will be the senior manager of the insolvent enterprise,
ultimately responsible for all decisions of the enterprise during the course of the
insolvency proceeding (subject to court supervision to ensure that the administrator properly performs his or her duties). In liquidation cases the administrator
will oversee the sale of the enterprise's assets and the collection and distribution
of the proceeds among the creditors. In reorganization cases the administrator
will oversee the formulation of the reorganization plan, the attendant negotia-
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tions with creditors, and the implementation of the plan. In all cases the administrator (or his or her appointed representative) will represent the enterprise
before the court.
In the British Commonwealth countries (and some other jurisdictions as well)
the administrator can be the appointee of a private creditor who holds a special
type of lien covering substantially all of the enterprise's movable assets. In that
event the administrator (called a receiver) will normally liquidate the secured
creditor's collateral for the creditor's benefit and turn over any excess proceeds
either to the enterprise or to a second administrator for distribution to the enterprise's unsecured creditors. Many countries have begun to impose duties of
"good faith" and "commercial reasonableness" upon privately appointed administrators in order to ensure that they observe accepted standards of commercial conduct in the fulfillment of their obligations. These duties are designed to
benefit other creditors of the enterprise. They can require, for example, that the
administrator attempt to obtain the highest price for assets sold, thereby increasing the likelihood that funds will be available for distribution to other creditors
after the secured creditor has been repaid.
A matter having nothing to do with the law, but everything to do with the
practical success of insolvency proceedings, is the availability of qualified individuals to serve as administrators. Initially, few people in an emerging market
economy may be qualified or experienced enough to serve as administrators. A
short-term solution is for the government to constitute an administrative agency
whose employees will serve as administrators. Nevertheless, there is often a
substantial concern (legitimate or not) in market economies that government
employees will be more interested in furthering political objectives than in seeking practical business solutions. A further concern (again, which may well not be
legitimate in all circumstances) is that relatively underpaid government employees are less likely to devote the necessary time and attention to administrator
appointments than are privately compensated (and, thus, economically motivated) insolvency specialists. An exception may occur in situations in which the
government provides financial assistance to the insolvent enterprise. In that event
there is less legitimacy to the argument that the government should not participate in the management of the enterprise.
Another possibility in the short term is to utilize the services of qualified
foreign administrators on the condition that they involve, and provide substantial
training and experience to, local administrator candidates. In the long term,
however, a group of experienced domestic insolvency practitioners eminently
qualified to take on administrator appointments will inevitably emerge. (One of
the tenets of capitalism is that a demand for a service or product results in the
development of an industry willing to supply that service or product for the right
price.) Ultimately, this group will divide itself into smaller groups with specialized expertise in particular industries and types of industries.
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b. Debtor in Possession
Many countries provide for circumstances in which the laws permit existing
management of an insolvent enterprise to remain in control of the business
without the interposition of a supervising administrator. In practice, however,
such an arrangement seldom occurs.
In the United States, on the other hand, it is the rule rather than the exception
in reorganization proceedings that existing management remains in control as the
"debtor in possession." (In straight liquidations an administrator is automatically appointed, however.) This practice has a number of reasons, many of them
having to do with historical and cultural precedents unique to the United States.
Most other countries, with their own differing business climates and harsher
societal attitudes toward insolvent enterprises, have remained reluctant to adopt
the debtor in possession approach in a meaningful way.
2. Committees
Often, it is impractical and too costly for individual unsecured creditors and
employees to participate actively in an insolvency proceeding in order to improve their prospects for recovering on their claims. Meaningful participation
often requires the retention of a lawyer familiar with the insolvency laws. Individual creditors and employees often conclude that their time and money can be
better spent in pursuing more productive possibilities outside of the insolvency
court. To address the concern that small creditors are unfairly excluded from the
insolvency system due to the time and expense involved, most insolvency laws
permit the formation of creditor committees or the appointment of creditor representatives to represent the interests of the unsecured creditor body as a whole.
It may also be appropriate, particularly in the context of labor-intensive enterprises, to form employee committees or appoint employee representatives to
ensure that the rights of the enterprise's employees are appropriately safeguarded. Finally, a nation may wish to consider providing for the creation of a
"committee of inspection" that would represent the interests of all creditors and
employees in the administration of an insolvency proceeding rather than creating
several committees for each case. The policy considerations supporting the creation of creditor and employee committees are more significant in reorganization
proceedings than in straight liquidations. In the latter case the proceeding often
involves little more than the quick sale of the enterprise's assets, presenting
fewer issues affecting employees' and creditors' recoveries.
D.

STAY OF CREDITOR ACTIONS

1. Imposition
Upon the commencement of an insolvency proceeding, the law should provide
for a stay of further creditor action against the insolvent enterprise. The stay
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provides creditors with the assurance that, from the date of the stay forward,
similar creditors will receive similar treatment without having "to race to the
courthouse" to enforce their rights. The stay is also designed to afford a business
an opportunity to examine its financial troubles without having to defend against
creditor action.
Such a stay may be effective automatically or may take effect upon the entry
of a court order, which order itself may be required or discretionary. An automatic stay allows an enterprise to focus more quickly on its financial troubles
because the enterprise does not have to litigate whether a stay need be imposed
generally or defend against particular actions. Generally speaking, an automatic
stay is preferable from an administrative point of view as well because it avoids
the issue of whether particular creditors have received actual notice of the imposition of a stay (often a problem area with discretionary stays issued pursuant
to specific court orders).
2. Scope
A stay may extend to as much or as little creditor action as a nation deems
appropriate. In some countries virtually all creditors, including secured creditors, are bound by the stay. In other countries unsecured creditors are stayed, but
secured creditors may continue to pursue their collateral as though the insolvency
filing had not occurred. The latter can effectively undermine many reorganization attempts, unless the secured creditors consider continued operation of the
business to be in their best interests, as the secured creditors often have liens
against assets that are crucial to the enterprise's continued operations. If, however, secured creditors are also stayed, the law should make clear that the secured
creditor does not lose its security interest, but is only prevented from enforcing
it during the pendency of the insolvency proceeding.
3. Duration
If the stay applies to secured creditor actions, it should remain in place for a
reasonable period of time, sufficient to allow the parties in interest (or the court,
if necessary) to assess the financial troubles of the business. In the case of a
liquidation the stay should prevent unsecured creditors from taking any action,
without the approval of the court, against any of the enterprise's property during
the pendency of the case. In the case of a reorganization the stay should remain
in place until a plan of reorganization has been approved and its provisions made
effective.
4. Relief
If the stay is to apply to secured creditors in reorganization cases, the law
should permit the secured creditors to seek relief from any stay that is imposed.
Such relief, whether to pursue an action against the enterprise or against its
property, could hinder the enterprise's ability to focus on its financial troubles.
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Accordingly, the law should require the secured creditor to demonstrate that the
detriment to the creditor occasioned by the stay materially exceeds the detriment
to the business (and its estate) in litigating with the creditor, or that the property
against which the creditor wishes to proceed is unnecessary to the continued
operations and attempted reorganization of the business.
E.

ESTATE

1. Property that the EnterpriseHolds
Upon the commencement of an insolvency proceeding an estate should be
created that consists of the property of the enterprise. The estate should include
all interests of the enterprise in any property (except exempt property, described
below), wherever it may be located, as of the date the case is begun. The estate
should be defined broadly to include as much property as possible so as to
maximize the distributions to creditors and employees.
In many countries the law permits a creditor to provide business with the
possession and use of property while retaining title to the property in the name
of the creditor. In those countries property subject to such "retention of title"
agreements is considered not to be property of the enterprise in the first instance,
and therefore not subject to the stay. In the United States, however, the implementation of a central filing system resulted in the elimination of retention of title
arrangements. The concern was that to uninformed creditors assets subject to a
retention of title agreement would appear to belong to the business and therefore
be available to satisfy the creditor's debt. Now, the important focus in the United
States is whether the creditor has properly recorded an interest in the property in
question, not whether title to the property nominally remained with the creditor.
(This is not meant to preclude true lease transactions, however, where the property is expected to have a material economic value at the end of the lease term
and the business is contractually required either to return the property to the
creditor or to pay to the creditor the remaining fair market value of the property.)
2. Exemptions
Whatever the extent of the insolvency estate, a nation may wish to exempt
certain property from this estate. Certain property may be necessary (especially
in cases of insolvent persons) for a fresh start. Without such exemptions, insolvent persons would be left destitute and unable to begin again, something an
insolvency law should not permit. Examples of the types of property a nation
may wish to exempt for individuals include household furnishings, clothing,
books, animals, crops, or musical instruments. Perhaps certain property used in
a trade (books, tools, etc.) should also be exempt, as should other property (such
as religious or ancestral items) that may have special significance.
There is less need to exempt property from the estate of an insolvent enterprise. Still, if during the transition period crucial enterprises are subjected to
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insolvency proceedings, certain assets such as land, buildings, and equipment
could be exempted as a means of ensuring that the enterprise is not liquidated.
3. The Estate's Causes of Action
In some instances creditors would be well served if the law permitted the administrator (or debtor in possession) to pursue causes of action against other
entities. For example, in the days leading up to the commencement of the insolvency proceedings the enterprise may have paid some creditors and not others,
often because the preferred creditors were more diligent or aggressive in pursuing
recovery on their claims or had a special relationship to the enterprise (an affiliated
enterprise, for example). In hindsight, the enterprise and its remaining creditors
would have been better served if the enterprise had commenced insolvency proceedings earlier, rather than preferring some creditors over others. Had the enterprise done so, the payments would have been available to help finance the
reorganization of the enterprise. In a liquidation scenario the payments would have
been available to be shared equally among all the unsecured creditors.
On the assumption that the enterprise made the payments at a time when it was
approaching insolvency, an insolvency law should allow the enterprise's estate, once
in insolvency proceedings, to recover any such payments that preferred some creditors over other creditors. The law should only permit such a recovery for relatively
recent preferential transfers, made within several months or so (no further back in
time than the presumption of insolvency can reasonably be extended) before the
commencement of the insolvency proceeding. The recovery period can be established by statute, for example, six months for ordinary payments and one year for
payments made to creditors with special relationships to the enterprise. Alternatively, the court can, in hindsight, pick the date within the prior one or two years on
which it became apparent that the enterprise was, in fact, insolvent.
In the days leading up to the commencement of the insolvency proceedings,
the enterprise may have also transferred property to another entity in a fraudulent
effort to conceal its assets from its creditors. An insolvency law should allow the
enterprise's estate to recover such transfers for the benefit of creditors. In determining whether any transfer was fraudulent, a court can examine the enterprise's actual intent. If the value of the property the enterprise received in
exchange for the transfer was disproportionately small when compared to the
value of the property the enterprise transferred, the court could infer an intent to
defraud. If the value of the enterprise's assets remaining after the transfer is
disproportionately small when compared to the amount of the enterprise's debts,
again the court could infer an intent to defraud.
Finally, an insolvency law might empower the enterprise's estate to avoid the
granting of security interests in the enterprise's property that were not properly
recorded at the commencement of the insolvency proceeding. Similarly, it could
avoid the creditor's security interest in pledge or retention of title transactions
when the transaction was not properly documented.
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CLAIMS

1. Proof
Every insolvency system is designed-at least in theory-to protect creditors,
and every insolvency system is designed-again, at least in theory-to provide
an efficient and economic means for the administration of the affairs of an
insolvent enterprise. Accordingly, every insolvency system has procedures for
creditors to prove their claims against the enterprise, so they can share in the
recoveries from its assets.
Two methods are available for handling creditors' claims: (1) require the
enterprise to disclose the amount and the nature of its obligations to its creditors;
(2) require the creditors to register their own independent proofs of claim. Different countries have adopted different combinations of these two methods, and
may even have different procedures for different kinds of insolvency proceedings
(liquidations or reorganizations).
Most systems allow filing or registration of claims by mail in order to expedite
the administration of the enterprise's affairs and reduce the inconvenience to
creditors who do not have easy access to the court. Further, most systems provide
standardized proof of claim forms that are simple enough so that individuals can
fill them out without professional advice. The standardized form requires the
inclusion of certain basic information (subject to fraud penalties if the creditor
knowingly includes false information) so that the administrator can make an
intelligent assessment of the validity of the claim merely by reviewing the completed form.
All types of creditors should probably be permitted to file proof of their
claims, whether for a fixed amount of debt or for claims that have yet to be
determined or fixed in amount (such as claims for breach of contract or tort). The
law should provide a means for estimating those claims that are not yet determined or fixed in amount, so that the claim is treated as if it were for a certain
amount for purposes of distribution under a liquidation or plan of reorganization.
The time for filing proofs of claim varies greatly from system to system. Some
systems do not set any final deadlines. In Australian insolvency cases the administrator gives notice of his or her intention to pay a dividend to creditors.
Creditors that fail to file a proof of claim after receipt of that notice are barred
from participation in that dividend. They can still participate in future dividends,
however, by later filing proofs of claim.
The time for filing claims should be short enough to allow for reasonably
speedy administration of the case, but long enough for creditors to receive actual
notice of the case, fill out their forms, and deliver their forms to the court by mail
or by person. Local authorities should set the time in light of practical considerations such as the quality of mail service, the availability of copying machines
to produce copies of debt records or supporting documentation, and delays that
might be required to translate documentation if local law requires that legal
documents be written in the local language.
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2. Secured Claims
Secured lending is a key component of the credit system of any market economy, and the extent to which secured lenders are affected by insolvencies and
insolvency laws can affect the availability and price of secured credit. The rights
of U.S. enterprises to stay foreclosures by secured creditors or to rewrite obligations to secured creditors in reorganization plans is a key difference between
the U.S. system and the systems of most other English-speaking countries. Many
practitioners in English-speaking countries are loath to encourage the spread of
these concepts outside of the United States.
The threshold question regarding allowance of secured creditors' claims is
whether they need prove their claims at all. If an insolvency system otherwise
leaves secured creditors free to liquidate their collateral without restraint by the
enterprise or the insolvency court, there is little reason to require every secured
creditor to prove its claim unless (1) the enterprise or other creditors dispute the
validity of the debt or the rights to the security, or (2) the secured creditor intends
to share in the proceeds of the enterprise's unpledged assets as a partially secured
creditor or an unsecured creditor.
As to the first issue, if the administrator or another party objects to the secured
creditor's claim or assertion of a security interest (because it was improperly
documented, for example), the court can hold a hearing to resolve the objection.
Pending resolution of such a hearing, the court, as a practical matter, will need
to be empowered to stay the secured creditor temporarily from exercising its
rights against the collateral. Accordingly, any such objection should be resolved
quickly.
As to the second issue, if secured creditors are not required to file proofs of
claim if they are fully secured (the value of their collateral is at least equal to the
amount of their claim) or willing to defer from sharing in the proceeds of the sale
or use of unsecured assets, an insolvency law will still have to provide procedures
for dealing with the undersecured creditors (the value of their collateral is less
than the amount of their claim) and the secured creditors that are willing to
surrender their security in exchange for being allowed to participate in the
insolvency proceeding. Secured creditors that are partially secured or that have
surrendered their collateral can be required to file claims for the balance of their
debt remaining after accounting for the net amount that they received, if any,
from the sale of their collateral. Administrators may or may not be granted the
right to redeem collateral for the values estimated by their secured creditors if the
secured creditors file proofs of claim.
3. PrivilegedClaims
Although every insolvency system is designed to protect creditors' interests by
treating creditors equally, every system provides that some creditors are "more
equal" than others. Therefore, certain kinds of claims are paid in full before
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distribution of the balance of the assets available to nonprivileged unsecured
creditors.
The amounts of claims that are entitled to privilege, and the relative priorities
of privileged claims among themselves, vary from system to system. Nevertheless, almost every system affords a measure of priority to the costs of the
insolvency proceeding itself. Indeed, some systems actually dismiss the proceeding unless the assets are sufficient to pay the costs of the proceeding. Employee claims and domestic (as opposed to foreign) tax claims also usually
receive priority. In Czechoslovakia, for example, a first privilege (after expenses
of the insolvency administration itself) is reserved for the rights of employees
accrued within three years prior to the insolvency proceeding; a second privilege
is reserved for taxes, customs dues, national insurance contributions, and the
like, accrued within those three years. A few other systems also grant priority to
tax claims from other countries, and to other favored groups such as consumers
that left deposits with the enterprise, or local farmers and fishermen. Belgium, on
the other hand, allows no privileges for any unsecured claims of any nature
incurred prior to the commencement of the proceeding.
Commercial law in some countries may also provide hidden privileges to
employees or tax claimants. Often, secured creditors holding liens on all of the
assets of an enterprise-the "blanket lien" or the "standard mortgage
debenture' '-pay outstanding employee wage claims from the proceeds of their
collateral before applying the proceeds to their debts. By the same token, lenders
in the United States with mortgages on office buildings or hotels effectively take
their collateral subject to real estate taxes, which are generally a lien on the real
estate in question with priority over any private mortgages (even if the real estate
taxes accrued after the creditor's mortgage was recorded).
Consideration may be given to placing a ceiling on the amount of employee
and tax claims entitled to privileged treatment. If the number of employees is
substantial, or if the tax arrearages are significant, often nothing is left over for
unsecured creditors unless the employee and tax claims are statutorily limited.
The privileged claims can be equal among themselves, or, as in the current
Czech law, the distribution can be hierarchical. That is, the claims in one privileged class are entitled to be paid in full before the claims in the next lower
privileged class become entitled to any distribution. If the funds are insufficient
to pay a privileged class in full, the claims in that privileged class share the
available funds on a pro rata basis. The claims entitled to privilege and the
structure of the privileges will depend on the policy decisions of the lawmakers.
While it is politically tempting to provide unlimited privilege to employee and
tax claims, it must be kept in mind that such a system will factor into the credit
analyses of potential creditors when they assess the likelihood of recovery on
their claims in the event of an insolvency. Accordingly, it might make sense to
limit the claims that will be afforded a priority or not to afford a priority to the
claims at all.
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4. Allowance
Any insolvency system must have a method for reviewing claims that are made
against the estate to assure that all creditors receive their fair share of the assets
either in a liquidation or a reorganization. The allowance process raises several
issues: the legal effect of a proof of claim; who has the right to object to a claim;
the time limit for objecting to a claim; who determines the validity of a claim;
and the ground rules for a hearing on the validity of a claim.
There are many possible resolutions to these issues. Some systems provide
that a properly completed proof of claim is prima facie proof of the validity of
the claim; others leave the question open. Some systems allow the enterprise, or
any creditor or party in interest to object to a claim; others provide for the
administrator to review claims and reject claims considered improper. Furthermore, some systems do not set a time limit for objecting to claims, while other
systems contemplate or require objections within certain time frames.
In some systems the assertion of an objection will automatically result in a
court hearing to resolve the objection. In administrator-oriented jurisdictions the
administrator is often empowered to reject the claim, and the creditor must
specifically request a court hearing if the creditor wants to overturn the administrator's decision.
The general ground rules for a hearing on the validity of a claim will depend
in large part on the general procedural law of the country in question. For
example, legal procedures in all of the English-speaking countries are governed
by common law notions of due process. Due process requires fair notice of a
legal action that could affect one's rights and an opportunity for a fair hearing on
that proposed action, with rights of appeal under certain circumstances. The
subject of due process goes far beyond the limited questions of disputes about
claims in insolvency proceedings because due process is central to an effective
legal system in any free market economy. Any insolvency law will function more
smoothly if it incorporates due process protections into the insolvency court
system.

G.

DISCHARGE

The discharge of its debts is one of the principal goals of an enterprise or
merchant entering a reorganization proceeding. Most insolvency systems afford
some measure of discharge. However, the kinds of debts dischargeable and the
procedure for obtaining a discharge vary widely from country to country.
To take these issues in reverse order, some countries provide for an automatic
discharge of all debts-except those specifically excluded by law-unless creditors take affirmative steps to restrict or deny a discharge. Other systems require
the enterprise to apply for a discharge after the commencement of the case.
Australian law covers both bases. It automatically discharges a bankrupt individual three years after the filing, while affording the individual an opportunity
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to apply for an earlier discharge following the meeting of creditors. The bankrupt's discharge may be significantly delayed, however, if the individual is found
to have been dishonest.
The grounds for objecting to a discharge are more consistent from place to
place. Most countries will bar a discharge if the enterprise has not kept adequate
books and records to explain its losses; has concealed or destroyed its books and
records; was engaged in reckless speculation; was engaged in fraud; or has
recently been the subject of another insolvency proceeding. Some countries also
grant a discharge only if the enterprise's assets are worth at least some percentage of the amount of its liabilities, unless the enterprise can prove that its
financial problems arose from circumstances beyond its control.
U.S. law provides an alternative to outright denial of a discharge by allowing
creditors either to object to a discharge in general or to the dischargeability of a
particular claim. An enterprise could thus be guilty of fraud in the United States
and receive a discharge of all claims other than the claim arising from the fraud.
Many countries draw distinctions between the discharges available to different
kinds of enterprises and discharges available under different kinds of insolvency
proceedings. For example, U.S. law denies discharges in liquidations unless the
debtor is an individual. However, it allows an enterprise to discharge debt under
a plan of reorganization if that enterprise will continue operations after confirmation of the reorganization plan.
Different countries have different policies on nondischargeability of specific
kinds of debts. A nation might decide to except from discharge: any claims
against the enterprise for fraud (if the fraud is proven) in order to discourage
fraud; claims for alimony or child support in order to ensure that the divorced can
support themselves and their children; claims for fines in order to enforce the
criminal laws; and claims for taxes in order to prevent enterprises or persons from
escaping their obligations as citizens. Further, in order to ensure an enterprise's
compliance with the provisions of the insolvency law, the law can provide that an
enterprise will be denied a discharge generally if it violates the law.
H.

LIQUIDATION

Liquidation proceedings are little more than the collection and sale of the enterprise's assets and the distribution of the proceeds to creditors according to the
priorities established by the insolvency law. In the event that the insolvent is a
person, and the policy is to permit a "fresh start," the person will receive a discharge
from the debts on which he or she was liable before the commencement of the
proceeding. Whether an enterprise receives a discharge in a liquidation proceeding
is irrelevant because the enterprise will have been dissolved and, in any event, will
have no remaining assets to apply in satisfaction of creditors' claims.
As noted above opinion may legitimately differ on whether it is more appropriate to appoint an administrator or to leave existing management in control in
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a reorganization case. Little dispute exists, however, that the appointment of a
administrator is appropriate in straight liquidation proceedings. Most persons and
enterprise managers will not be experts at collecting and selling assets pursuant
to the insolvency law and distributing proceeds according to relevant priorities.
Accordingly, the creditors or the court should be able to select capable administrators to oversee the liquidation.
The administrator can be made responsible for preparing lists of creditors, a
schedule of assets and liabilities, and a schedule of income and expenditures that
the enterprise would otherwise have to file. The administrator should then be
required to examine potential causes of action against other entities, decide
which ones are worth pursuing, and prosecute them. Further, if it makes sense,
the administrator should have the power to operate the enterprise's business for
a limited period of time until the assets can be sold. The administrator should
coordinate the sales of the various assets and collect the proceeds. Finally, the
administrator should distribute the proceeds to the various creditors according to
the priorities set forth in the law.
After the distribution the person or enterprise should be discharged from its
debts (if permitted by the law) and the case should be closed. The administrator
should file a final report describing the assets sold, the amounts for which they
were sold, and how the proceeds were distributed. In cases where the enterprise
has essentially no assets, a nation may wish to consider whether the law should
require the government to fund an impartial investigation of the enterprise.
I.

REORGANIZATION

A reorganization proceeding can be divided into two parts: (1) operation of an
enterprise's business after the commencement of the proceeding, and (2) the
development and implementation of a plan (also called a scheme or a proposal)
to restructure the enterprise's operations and debts. An insolvency law should
address both parts in order to ensure that the enterprise is operated in a way that
minimizes financial losses during the case, and that the plan of reorganization has
the approval of as many creditors as possible. The law should also require the
reorganization plan to provide those creditors who do not approve of the plan
with a distribution no smaller than the law specifies.
1. Operation of the Business
a. Use of Property
Ordinarily, a reorganizing enterprise should, under the supervision of a administrator (or the debtor in possession if considered appropriate), be authorized
to continue to operate in the ordinary course of its business without a great deal
of court or creditor supervision. The enterprise should be able to continue to
deliver its products or services, collect payment, and pay its ordinary bills. To
require court or creditor review of each business decision would be cumbersome.
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It would also reduce the efficiency of the business to the detriment of the estate
and its creditors.
Creditor and court review should be limited to actions proposed by the administrator that are not in the "ordinary course" of the enterprise's business, for
example, a sale of some assets. Creditors should have the opportunity to review
any proposed extraordinary action and voice to the court their views about the
wisdom of such actions. This type of creditor review would apply only to
court-appointed administrators, since privately appointed administrators by their
nature act at the behest of secured creditors to liquidate the creditor's collateral.
Further, if the administrator's proposed action concerns property of the estate,
and a creditor has an interest (a security interest for example) in that property,
that creditor should receive some assurance that its interest in the property will
be protected. If, for example, the administrator proposes to sell property in
which a creditor has a security interest, the creditor could receive an interest in
the proceeds of the property as a replacement.
b. Credit
Because credit is crucial to most enterprise's operations, and especially those of
a financially troubled enterprise, a reorganizing enterprise ought to be able to obtain
credit. So long as such credit is unsecured and incurred in the ordinary course of the
enterprise's business, the enterprise ought to be able to obtain such credit without the
approval of creditors or the court. In order to encourage others to continue to do
business with the insolvent enterprise, claims on account of such credit should be
afforded a priority in the enterprise's eventual plan of reorganization.
If, however, the enterprise requires more credit, and the administrator can find
a willing lender, the law should provide the administrator with the ability to
obtain more credit. Available lenders will probably insist on a security interest in
some or all of the business's assets. Some lenders will further require that their
security interest be senior to any other security interests in the property. Accordingly, the law should provide the administrator with the ability to grant such
security interests, so long as other creditors who have an interest in the property
to be pledged receive some protection of their interest. For example, if an
administrator grants a security interest to a new lender that is senior to another
security interest, the administrator might pay an appropriate sum of money to the
holder of the older security interest. Such a payment would prevent the aggregate
distribution to that creditor from being diminished.
c. Contracts
The general contracts (for example, contracts for sales, purchases, and services, or leases) to which a reorganizing enterprise is a party may, in addition to
its credit contracts, be a source of difficulty for the enterprise. An insolvency law
should thus permit an enterprise to examine its contracts and decide whether
those contracts will be honored or repudiated by the enterprise. An administrator
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should have the ability to decide that certain of its contracts are no longer
beneficial to the business and simply repudiate the enterprise's obligations under
those contracts. The other parties to such repudiated contracts should be able to
claim damages against the estate on account of the repudiation.
If, on the other hand, the administrator decides that a given contract is important
to retain, the administrator should have the opportunity to assume such contract
and the obligations that go with it. The insolvency law can set a deadline by which
the administrator must decide whether it will repudiate or assume contracts. It may
be appropriate to allow the administrator to make such decisions through the date
a plan of reorganization is confirmed. At that time, the administrator will know
better which contracts the enterprise requires and can perform.
2. Plan of Reorganization
Soon after the commencement of a reorganization proceeding, the administrator should begin to prepare a plan of reorganization. The plan should classify
the claims against the estate; specify the .treatment to be afforded the various
classes (how the enterprise will pay the various claims); identify which contracts
are repudiated and which assumed; and establish the means for implementation
of the proposed restructuring.
The law should address who may file a plan of reorganization. Certainly the
administrator ought to be empowered to do so, but creditors (and even employees) might also be so empowered. The ability to file a plan and solicit votes is a
powerful negotiating tool. Accordingly, perhaps the administrator could be afforded a period during which no other party may submit a plan for consideration.
Creditors might be able to file plans if the administrator proves incapable of
proposing an acceptable plan.
Once a plan has been prepared, all parties in interest ought to have the opportunity to vote on the plan. The law should describe how votes are to be
registered and the percentage of the claims that must approve the plan before it
will be considered approved.
III. Conclusion
This discussion of an insolvency law, its purposes, implementation, and provisions is a mere overview of major issues that emerging market economies are
likely to encounter as they implement their transitions. This article is designed
primarily to highlight the more significant issues relevant to an insolvency system and is not intended to serve as a recommendation to implement any particular policy or system. Before specific recommendations can be made, a nation
will have to make an informed judgment as to the major policy objectives that it
wants to accomplish through its insolvency laws. Then, with the policy considerations firmly established, a nation can undertake to draft the specific provisions
of an insolvency law designed to promote the selected policies.
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